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Abstract: The contemporary debate about “who is a journalist” is occurring in
two distinct domains: law and professional ethics. Although the debate in
these domains is focused on separate problems, participants treat the central
question as essentially the same. This article suggests that the debates in law
and professional ethics have to be resolved independently and that debate
within those domains needs to be more nuanced. In law, it must vary
depending on whether the context involves constitutional law, statutory law,
or the distribution of informal privileges by government officials. In
professional ethics, the debate should not be oriented around a single
definitional threshold but should identify tiers that take account of different
communicators' unique goals, tactics, and values.

Introduction
The burgeoning of media technology and the evolution of news
formats has made the issue of journalistic identity more complicated
and consequential. Courts have had to define more clearly the people
entitled to claim legal protections traditionally provided to journalists,
while mainstream reporters and editors have been challenged to
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differentiate themselves from the emergent class of bloggers,
dilettantes, and do-it-yourselfers. At the same time, mainstream
journalists continue to battle each other for the loyalties of readers
and viewers who are increasingly sympathetic to charges that the
established media are feckless, shallow, or biased.
It is difficult to say whether the debate over the question of
“who is a journalist” has been fruitful. Courts and legislatures have
adopted disparate definitions, and many journalists seem to be
growing weary of the discussion. In an online forum hosted by the
Poynter Institute, for example, one reporter insisted that “we all know
what a journalist is, and it's silliness to argue about it,” while another
dismissed the whole matter as “just so much sanctimonious bullshit”
(Poynter, 2001). We believe the discussion ought to be continued, but
it will never be productive unless the parties are clear about the aims
of the inquiry and the contexts in which the answers are relevant.
The matter of who is a journalist is salient in at least two separate
domains: law and professional ethics. Within each of these domains
are multiple contexts in which the question is relevant, each with its
own purposes and consequences.
This article describes and evaluates the attempts by courts,
legislators, and other government officials to fashion a definition of
journalist, to assess their failures and successes, and to explain how
their efforts are relevant—or not—to the search for a definition in the
professional ethics domain. It also proposes a set of categories to use
in distinguishing the work of various communicators in that domain.

Differentiating the Central Domains
Some people resolve the question of who is a journalist by
leaning on clichés or making “I-know-it-when-I-see-it” kinds of
arguments. Others believe the question should not be addressed at all,
fearing that any agreement on a definition might be a first step toward
“licensing of journalists and ultimately to censorship” (Meyer, 2002, p.
11A). Between those extremes, however, are a number of discrete
arguments distinguished either by their core assumptions or their
particular points of emphasis.
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The central problem is that participants in the debate have
presented their individual conceptions of journalist as universal,
without regard to the peculiarities of context. At the broadest level,
they have failed to specify the domains in which they are operating
(law versus professional ethics), even though the aims of the inquiry
are quite different in each. Also, participants have failed to
acknowledge important distinctions within those domains and the
inevitability, if not the necessity, of recognizing and applying more
than a single definition.
Although it is important to draw distinctions between law and
ethics in exploring the issue of journalistic identity, these two domains
are overlapping and interdependent. By illuminating fundamental
human values and moral imperatives, ethics helps give force and
legitimacy to legal mandates. By demarcating the boundaries of
citizens' behavior, law accomplishes through coercion what ethics is
often unable to achieve solely through appeals to conscience. Law and
ethics are also related in that they are both concerned with the
advancement of some socially shared vision of the public good.
Nevertheless, the debates in each of these domains have clearly
different purposes.
The law domain is shaped by the classical liberal ideas of
autonomy, reason, and self-determination and is best characterized by
libertarian press theory and its tangents, which assume that society is
best served by removing all but the most essential barriers to free
expression (Rivers, Schramm, & Christians, 1980). Because it is
presupposed in this domain that “debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open” ( New York Times v. Sullivan,
1964, p. 270) and that the public is enriched by its exposure to
“diverse and antagonistic sources” of information ( Associated Press v.
U.S., 1945, p. 20), the bias is toward an expansive definition of
journalist.
In the professional ethics domain, the motive for defining a
journalist is not to enable free expression but to separate credible
contributors from less credible ones by establishing benchmarks of
professional practice and measuring people against them. It is
exclusive, not inclusive. Here, theories emphasizing social
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responsibility, shared commitments, and other communitarian ideals
are dominant (see Rivers et al., 1980; Nerone, 1995; Commission on
Freedom of the Press, 1947). Unlike in the law domain where there is
resistance to discrimination among speakers, here it is essential. While
the legal debate is about people's ability to freely contribute news and
information in the ideas marketplace, the professional ethics debate is
about the relative value of those contributions. Those kinds of
qualitative judgments are enabled by, and help reinforce, narrower
definitions than those favored in law.
The basic distinctions
between law and professional
ethics are rarely made in this
debate.

The basic distinctions between law and professional ethics are
rarely made in this debate. Legal and ethical arguments are routinely
juxtaposed in falsely dichotomous ways, which either misdirects or
halts the dialog. An article in Quill, a publication of the Society of
Professional Journalists, provided one small example. It quoted Tom
Rosenstiel of the Committee of Concerned Journalists, who argued that
journalism is not about affiliations but actions. “You can't say, ‘I’m a
journalist, here's my press pass,' ” Rosenstiel said. “You have to say,
‘I’m a journalist. Here's my work.' Some of the people with press
passes don't make the cut” (Barton, 2002, p. 11). This was contrasted
with what the writer described as the “broader, more inclusive view” of
Lucy Dalglish, head of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, who suggested that a journalist is “someone who is collecting
information with the purpose of disseminating it to the public” (Barton,
2002, p. 11).
These comments were presented as competing points of view,
when in fact they were aimed at completely different questions, or at
least different aspects of the same question. Their attentions might
have been focused on the same phrase—who is a journalist—but
Rosenstiel was clearly working in the domain of professional ethics,
trying to aid our judgments about whom to trust in the world of news,
while Dalglish was clearly working in the domain of law, trying to
propose some minimum eligibility standard for access to legal
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protections. Both opinions are reconcilable and are indeed consistent
with the prevailing approaches in their respective domains: in law, an
egalitarian model that emphasizes equal access to rights and
privileges, and in professional ethics, an expert model that emphasizes
the unique proficiencies and duties of media professionals.
It is often problematic when the language of one domain is used
in the other, or when the contributors are unclear about the specific
issues to which their comments are directed. People proposing narrow
definitions are labeled as enemies of the First Amendment, and those
proposing broader definitions are derided for giving anonymous online
hacks the same treatment as the most esteemed veterans of the
media mainstream. The hypersensitivity to perceived assaults on the
First Amendment is particularly destructive because it impedes the
more meaningful debate about what matters in the world of
communication and what sources deserve our notice and trust.
Because traditional journalists have the most to lose in competition
with their less established rivals, it is in their interest to establish a
clear professional identity. But they seem almost more apprehensive
than their counterparts to participate in the debate, perhaps fearing
that any attempts to define what they do might weaken their own First
Amendment freedoms, or might harden their rights at the expense of
someone else's, which is not an outcome most traditional journalists
would celebrate.
In addition to conflating the two principal domains, the parties
also overlook subtleties within them. In law, there are at least three
unique contexts in which the definitional dilemma arises: constitutional
law, statutory law, and informal privileges granted by government
officials. Each of these requires separate analysis. The same is true in
the professional ethics domain where the participants tend to build
their arguments around the clumsy dichotomy of journalist/nonjournalist when a more tiered approach, with multiple definitions,
might be both necessary and unavoidable. So, instead of pursuing a
single set of criteria, we might recognize gradations that acknowledge
the peculiar contributions and roles of different communicators. In
doing so, there may be a temptation to look to the law for guidance.
The definitions in that domain already exist in concrete form—they are
spelled out in statutes and court opinions. However, not only are many
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of those definitions flawed, but they also are often unsuitable in the
domain of professional ethics, where the focus is more on best
practices than minimum standards.

The Law Domain
Constitutional Law
Although the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains
only 14 words devoted to speech and press, the federal courts have
outlined with relative clarity the scope of people's freedom to
disseminate information and ideas. The courts have been less clear
about whether the First Amendment also protects people's right to
gather news and whether the Constitution endows journalists with
protections unavailable to other citizens. The Supreme Court has never
explicitly recognized any unique protections for journalists, although a
few of its decisions, perhaps inadvertently, have come close. In
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, for example, the Court held that
“the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot
stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant …”
(emphasis added) ( Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 1986, p. 777).
This reference was repeated in subsequent cases and was read by
some as recognition of separate constitutional standards for
journalists.
At least one former member of the Court, Justice Potter Stewart
(1975), argued that the press status of a litigant is constitutionally
relevant and that media litigants should be afforded special rights not
available to the public generally. Stewart argued that the Press Clause
of the First Amendment should be read separately from the Speech
Clause, and that the former should be understood as an explicit
guarantee of unique protections for the “institution of the press,”
which he defined as the “the daily newspapers and other established
news media” (p. 634). Any other interpretation, Stewart said, would
turn the Press Clause into a “constitutional redundancy” (p. 631).
Among other things, Stewart lobbied for recognition of a “reporter's
privilege.” He argued that these kinds of protections are essential to
facilitating the press' “organized, expert scrutiny of government” (p.
634).
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Although Stewart was the only member of the Court to publicly
promote this expert model of the press, much of the Court's rhetoric
about the press fits comfortably within that framework. The justices
routinely cast freedom of the press in instrumental terms, suggesting
that neither the press nor individual journalists are free for their own
purposes but to enhance “discourse for the sake of a citizenry better
informed and thus more prudently self-governed” ( Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 1991, Souter dissent, p. 677). In addition, the news media
have a “constitutionally established role” (Saxbe, Powell concurrence,
1974, p. 864) of fostering “discussion of governmental affairs” and
other public issues ( Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super Ct. for Norfolk
County, 1982, p. 604). Justice White put it more bluntly in Tornillo:
“The press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry” ( Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, 1974, White dissent, p. 258). These references are
in line with the expert model in which the press employs its unique
credentials to serve as the public's proxy in its supervision of
government.
Despite these indefinite references, the Court's rulings do not
support Stewart's framework or the recognition of special rights. In
fact, the Court plainly rejected his bifurcated construction of the First
Amendment in its only reporter's privilege case, Branzburg v. Hayes
(1972). In Branzburg, the Court ruled against several reporters who
claimed the First Amendment protected their refusal to comply with
grand jury subpoenas. The reporters argued that the subpoenas
breached their editorial autonomy and threatened the sanctity of their
confidential source relationships. The Court disagreed, relying on the
common law maxim that the public has a right to “every man's
evidence” (p. 674). One of the Court's principal concerns was that
recognition of a privilege would force courts to define the class of
citizens entitled to invoke its protections. This was a “questionable
procedure,” the Court wrote, “in light of the traditional doctrine that
liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large
metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition
methods” (p. 704). The Court added that the “informative function
asserted by representatives of the press … is also performed by
lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and
dramatists” (p. 705). This echoed language from one of the Court's
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earliest First Amendment cases in which it held that freedom of the
press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion” ( Lovell v. Griffin, 1938, p. 452).
Two key models emerge from
the Supreme Court’s opinions:
an expert model … and an
egalitarian model.

Two key models emerge from the Supreme Court's opinions: an
expert model, in which journalists are conceived of as a uniquely
qualified and clearly identifiable collection of professionals who serve
as agents of the public in the procurement and dissemination of news,
and an egalitarian model—illuminated by Branzburg and Lovell—in
which all citizens are equally equipped and equally free to serve as
newsgathering watchdogs. Because the Court has refused to recognize
any special protections for journalists under the First Amendment,
these definitional distinctions would seem to be of no consequence.
But in the 35 years since Branzburg, most federal circuit courts have
recognized a First Amendment reporter's privilege. They have done so
not by ignoring Branzburg but by limiting it to its peculiar facts and
differentiating all but the most closely analogous cases.
Although the circuit courts have taken a jaundiced view of the
Branzburg ruling, they have consistently embraced its egalitarian
conception of the press. What was viewed as an obstacle by the
Branzburg court—the potentially boundless criteria for eligibility—has
been treated by the lower courts as the privilege's saving grace. In
fashioning more wide-ranging definitions that are not tied to salary,
education, experience or other credentials, the lower courts have
effectively solved the “special rights” dilemma by making the privilege
available to any citizen industrious enough to seek and report news.
The most widely cited test in recent opinions is the one
articulated by the Second Circuit in Von Bulow v. Von Bulow (1987). It
requires that the person claiming the privilege show “the intent to use
the material—sought, gathered, or received—to disseminate
information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception
of the newsgathering process” (p. 144). The Ninth Circuit and the D.C.
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Circuit have explicitly endorsed that test, and the Third Circuit has
adopted one that is nearly identical, except that it emphasizes
“investigative reporting” ( In re Madden, 1998, p. 130). Several other
circuits have addressed the issue less formally, but all have shown a
clear preference for functional criteria, such as the intent of the
newsgatherer and the nature of the information, rather than on the
medium employed or the newsgatherer's expertise or other
qualifications. The federal courts have consistently employed broad
criteria and have found investigative book authors ( Shoen v. Shoen,
1993), filmmakers ( Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 1977), scholars
( Cusumano v. Microsoft, 1998), and publishers of technical
newsletters ( Apicela v. McNeil Lab Inc., 1975) to be journalists for
purposes of the privilege. And although the cases are not abundant,
there can be little doubt that the federal courts will continue to make
the privilege available to those disseminating news through newer
media.

Assessing the Debate
Because debate on this track is focused on the dimensions of a
constitutional right, the courts' embrace of the egalitarian model and
their adoption of broad eligibility criteria are certainly warranted. The
protections outlined in the Bill of Rights are fundamental and represent
the core, constitutive freedoms essential for people's productive,
democratic participation and their ability to lead autonomous, selfdirected lives. Furthermore, constitutional rights are not merely the
means by which we advance social goals; they are the bases upon
which we preserve moral principles—in this case, our individual liberty
in the pursuit and expression of our perceived truths. To permit access
to those rights only by those who meet certain artificial criteria would
be inconsistent with the broader tenor of the Constitution, which
champions equality and eschews class distinctions. As Philip Bobbitt
(1982) suggested, this “constitutional ethos”—the “cadence of our
rights” expressed through the document—should guide our
interpretation of the Constitution's discrete passages (pp. 176–177). It
is not insignificant that the other rights enshrined in the Constitution
are available to all citizens equally and not to particular social subsets.
That is not to say that a right can be invoked by any person in any
context. A person still needs to be engaged in the underlying behavior
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that the right protects—in this case gathering and disseminating
news—but factors other than behavior, such as characteristics,
credentials, or affiliations, should be left out of the equation.

Statutory Law
With the exception of the reporter's privilege, which is now
recognized in one form or another in most federal circuits, the courts
have not interpreted the Constitution as providing any special rights
for journalists. Congress and the state legislatures, however, have
passed a number of laws creating some unique protections. Thirtythree states and the District of Columbia have passed shield laws that
give journalists explicit protections against certain subpoenas, and as
of this writing there are two bills before Congress that would establish
a federal shield law. Thirty-one states have also passed retraction
statutes that allow media defendants to minimize their liability in
defamation suits by retracting the allegedly defamatory material.
Some states' long-arm statutes, which govern courts' jurisdiction over
various litigants, provide special dispensation for media defendants.
Also, some freedom of information (FOI) laws waive the search fees
and photocopying costs when the requester is a journalist.
Most of these laws contain some language defining “journalist”
or “the press,” but they are much narrower and more focused on
traditional media than the definitions used by courts in First
Amendment reporter's privilege cases. Both the statutory language
and the statements made by courts interpreting those statutes are
reflective of an expert conception of the press, which is manifest in
several ways. One is by an emphasis on occupational status. The
language from the Florida shield law is typical in that it defines a
journalist as “a person regularly engaged in [newsgathering] for gain
or livelihood, who obtained the information sought while working as a
salaried employee …” (emphases added). Similarly, the D.C. shield law
requires that a person be “employed by the news media;” the Indiana
law requires a person to be “an editorial or reportorial employee, who
receives or has received income” for newsgathering; and the Delaware
law even includes a requirement that a person be employed at least 20
hours per week before he or she qualifies. Other references to
employment are less definite, such as the laws in Alaska, Illinois,
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Louisiana, and North Carolina, which refer to those engaged “in the
business” of newsgathering.
Most shield laws also limit their application to material
disseminated in particular media. The North Dakota statute provides a
more egalitarian example in that it protects journalists working for
“any organization engaged in publishing or broadcasting news,” but
most other statutes specifically identify the covered media, which
presumably excludes those not mentioned. The Nebraska law provides
a more exhaustive list than most—it protects “any newspaper,
magazine, other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire
service, news or feature syndicate, broadcast station or network, or
cable television system”—and yet it still leaves out scholars,
documentarians, bloggers, and many others. Some statutes also add
vague qualifiers, such as the Indiana law that says individuals must be
“bona fide” employees of “legitimate” news organizations and the
Rhode Island law that requires that someone work for an “accredited”
news organization, whatever that is. The lists of covered media
included in the two bills before Congress are comprehensive, although
an earlier version of the Senate bill would not have covered news
organizations that publish only on the Web. Retraction statues follow
similar patterns and are even more likely than shield laws to explicitly
protect only traditional media. The Tennessee statute, for example, is
one of several that allow a retraction to serve as a partial defense in a
libel case but only where the defendant is a “newspaper or periodical.”
The courts have mostly taken a conservative approach to interpreting
these statutes, and they occasionally color their opinions with expertmodel rhetoric. In Matera v. Superior Court, for example, an Arizona
court held that the state shield law was “not designed to protect the
information collected, but rather was designed to aid a specific class—
members of the media—in performing their jobs” (emphasis added)
( Matera v. Superior Court, 1992, p. 973). Because the courts have
been unwilling to reach beyond the text to protect people or media not
specifically mentioned, the kinds of people commonly protected by
federal courts in the constitutional privilege context are often denied
statutory protection. These exclusions are not limited to
unconventional newsgatherers either. Time magazine, for example—a
quintessentially mainstream publication—was denied protection under
the Alabama shield law because the statute mentions newspapers but
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not magazines ( Price v. Time, 2005). The courts have taken a
similarly strict approach in their interpretation of retraction statutes.
The Wisconsin courts, for example, have held that because that state's
statute only mentions print publications, it cannot be invoked by
broadcasters ( Hucko v. Joseph Schlitz, 1981) or operators of
electronic bulletin boards (It's in the Cards, 1995).
The courts are not entirely to blame for these results. The basic
rule of judicial review is that “any conflict between the legislative will
and the judicial must be resolved in favor of the former” (Dickerson,
1975, p. 8). So even if the courts believe a statutory definition has
been too narrowly drawn, they have little discretion to amend it
through judicial fiat.

Assessing the Debate
Although the legal debates over who is a journalist are often
conducted under the same umbrella, the constitutional debate and the
statutory debate are distinct, or should be, and are capable of pointing
to different but equally legitimate conclusions. Constitutions and
statutes are both valid sources of law, but there are important
differences that ought to guide our inquiries as well as our scrutiny of
the judgments already made by courts and legislatures.
(T)he difference between
constitutional law and
statutory law is that the former
guarantees rights while the
latter confers privileges.
Fundamentally, the difference between constitutional law and
statutory law is that the former guarantees rights while the latter
confers privileges. A shield law does not give journalists a right to
avoid subpoenas; it merely grants them a privilege that can be taken
away at the whim of a legislative majority. When we say that someone
has a right to do something or to refrain from doing it, we mean, as
Dworkin (1978) put it, “that it would be wrong to interfere with his
doing it” (p. 188). We do not mean wrong in the practical sense of it
being ill-advised; we mean wrong in the moral sense of it being a
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violation. This distinction is akin to the one Dworkin made between
policies and principles. A policy is “that kind of standard that sets out a
goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic,
social, or political feature of the community,” whereas a principle is “a
standard that is to be observed … because it is a requirement of
justice, or fairness or some other dimension of morality” (p. 22). The
Constitution is the guarantor of rights and is society's ultimate
expression of principle. Statutes, on the other hand, are merely the
tools by which we direct our day-to-day lives and are more strictly
utilitarian.
Many arguments can and should be made in favor of more
egalitarian statutory definitions. Statutes that require a claimant to be
engaged in newsgathering as part of their employment or “for gain or
livelihood” are hard to defend in a world where some of the most
important news stories are broken by bloggers working without pay or
institutional affiliations. Statutes that fail to include Internet
communicators in their lists of covered parties, then, are
underinclusive and in need of amendment. For that matter, statutes
that offer blanket coverage for all employees of traditional news
organizations are overinclusive. Why should a travel writer for a
newspaper be afforded more protection than, say, a Pulitzer-Prize
winning author of investigative books on American politics? One
solution would be to simply redraw the lines in ways that are more
encompassing. A better approach, however, and one that addresses
the overinclusiveness problem, is to use the same functional criteria
that the federal courts have employed in the constitutional context.
This gives the courts the ability to make more nuanced determinations
to ensure that those who need protection get it and those who don't
are not using it to evade an otherwise valid subpoena.
The same approach should be used with other privilege-granting
laws, such as the retraction statutes, which, even more than the shield
laws, are focused on conventional media. Legislators should be asked
to explain why it is socially valuable to encourage newspapers to
retract their false and defamatory stories but not to provide the same
incentives for broadcasters, bloggers, or other mass communicators.
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Informal Privileges
In addition to the constitutional and statutory rights and
privileges provided to journalists, government officials often confer
other benefits that can present legal, ethical, and practical problems.
The Supreme Court sets aside seats in its courtroom for use by certain
news organizations. The President invites some members of the press
to accompany him on Air Force One. Members of Congress often allow
only credentialed journalists to attend their news conferences. And
there are a host of other contexts in which public officials at all levels
of government serve as the arbiters of access. They must establish
criteria by which to make those determinations, but more as a matter
of fairness than law.
For the most part, public officials have no obligation to make
special arrangements for the press. Courts have consistently held that
there is no First Amendment right of access to places ( Houchins v.
KQED, 1978)—courtrooms being the only exception ( Richmond
Newspapers v. Virginia, 1980)—and that elected officials have no legal
obligation to speak to the press ( Baltimore Sun Co. v. Erlich, 2006).
This discretion, however, is not without limit. The government's
greater authority to deny access entirely does not include the lesser
authority to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint, for example. Public
officials are given wide latitude, and they generally open their doors to
traditional media that reach the widest audiences.

Assessing the Debate
By denying access, government officials are certainly limiting
opportunities for the acquisition of news, but because they have no
obligation to provide access in the first place the denials do not take
on a constitutional dimension. This is true even if the government
provides access to some and not others (except in those situations
where the decisions are made on the basis of viewpoint or on the basis
of immutable characteristics such as race or gender). There should be
no expectation, then, that government officials will favor the wideranging criteria of the egalitarian model in making their access
determinations.
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Indeed, even as a simple matter of policy, that kind of
encompassing definitional standard would probably be unworkable.
Officials must take into account practical considerations in this context
that are not present in the constitutional context—namely, the finite
space available in which to accommodate media representatives. Only
so many individuals can physically fit into the White House Press Room
or the House and Senate chambers. A truly egalitarian access policy
might not be feasible in light of these practical problems and
administrative burdens. At some point, officials would be forced to ask
whether implementing such a policy would ultimately misdirect the
time and efforts of government employees who must attend to the
public's business. If constitutional rights were involved, the
government would be expected to absorb more of these burdens, but
in the context of informal administrative policymaking, officials are
free to engage in more straightforward cost-benefit analyses.
For many of the reasons just noted, the definitional issue in the
access context can also be distinguished from that in the statutory
context. The same kinds of practical and administrative considerations
are applicable, and government officials are under no legal obligation
to adopt broad criteria. This would be different if, for example, they
were being asked to implement a statute that guaranteed access for
journalists but that did not include a clear definition. In that case,
there would be a popular mandate in favor of access that would have
to be respected. But in the typical access/informal privilege situation,
the courts would likely view these decisions as more akin to
housekeeping than policymaking.
Legally, then, government officials have little compulsion to
accommodate the interests of journalists; indeed, they need not
provide access at all. On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to
expect them to embrace more egalitarian approaches. This might
seem like a quaint expectation in a world of cold partisanship, but
public officials still do have a duty to act in ways that put society's
collective interests ahead of their own.
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The Professional Ethics Domain
Unlike in the law domain where courts and legislatures establish
definitions that are imposed upon others, in the professional ethics
domain the definitional question ultimately rests with individual media
consumers. In this domain, no one has the power to mandate
adherence to a particular definition, nor is it necessary to seek any
kind of social consensus. Each of us has our own conception, built
around our peculiar criteria and embedded within the broader
interpretive frameworks we apply to all information. So, it is perilous
to orient the debate around a simple journalist/nonjournalist
dichotomy when there are potentially as many definitions of journalist
as there are consumers of journalism. Nevertheless, one might make
some threshold distinctions that seem to represent the logical cut-lines
in this domain, even though they are unavoidably imperfect. One
distinction can be made between public communicators—people who
disseminate newsworthy information to others but in a sporadic and
unregimented way—and second-level journalists—those who gather
and disseminate news more deliberately, regularly and conspicuously.
Another distinction can be made between second-level journalists and
top-level journalists. Second-level journalists are focused solely on the
dissemination of truthful, newsworthy information, as are top-level
journalists. The latter, however, are also committed to gathering and
telling stories in a particular way, one that honors the higher virtues
that have traditionally shaped the profession. These distinctions are
described more fully next, with particular attention paid to whether the
definitional models from the law domain have any applicability in the
domain of professional ethics.

Public Communicators vs. Second-Level Journalists
One distinction that could be made is between ordinary public
communicators and what we might call second-level journalists. Public
communicators are those who contribute something to the world of
knowledge by disseminating ideas or information to others but who do
so only occasionally or without a permanent media presence that
subjects their work to the normal mechanisms of accountability. A
college professor giving a public address, a witness to a terrorist
attack who posts a video on You Tube, or an aspiring film critic who
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sends reviews to others through a listserv would all fall into this
category, as would professionals in advertising, public relations, or
other fields whose communications are not designed to report on
important events occurring in society.
Second-level journalists ... are
engaged in … regular,
systematic, and conspicuous
dissemination of news
Second-level journalists, on the other hand, are engaged in a
more regular, systematic, and conspicuous dissemination of news.
Unlike other public communicators, their efforts are continuous and
their contributions are made with some predictability and purpose;
they are not simply incidental to some other goal. Second-level
journalists' raison d'être is the communication of what they in good
faith believe is truthful information. However, unlike top-level
journalists, they do not adhere to the standards of practice and core
values that have traditionally defined the profession and that are
promulgated in industry codes (e.g., the Society of Professional
Journalists Code of Ethics) and organizational handbooks (e.g., the
New York Times' “Ethical Journalism Handbook”).
Because the current debate over journalistic identity was
triggered by the emergence of bloggers and other Web
communicators, the participants in the professional ethics domain tend
to structure their arguments in ways that separate new media and old
media. Their definitions focus on differences in technology and medium
instead of content, function, and method. This is certainly true with
respect to bloggers who are regularly represented as functionally
indistinguishable from one another, as in this sweeping denunciation
by the Wall Street Journal's Joseph Rago: “Every conceivable belief is
on the scene, but the collective prose, by and large, is homogenous: a
tone of careless informality prevails; posts oscillate between the
uselessly brief and the uselessly logorrheic” and “complexity and
complication are eschewed” (2006, p. A18).
This broad-brushing is also common in polls. A survey by the
Pew Internet & American Life Project, for example, found that 65
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percent of bloggers do not see their work “as a form of journalism”
(Lenhart & Fox, 2006, July 19). A University of Connecticut (2006) poll
found that traditional journalists have a “low regard” for “news”
presented in blogs, and that only 11 percent of journalists rate news
on blogs as “excellent” or “good.” According to a BBC poll, only 25
percent of the public says it has “a lot” or “some” trust in blogs
(BBC/Reuters/Media Center, 2006). These surveys might be helpful for
some purposes, but they do little to advance the definitional debate.
As of early 2007, 12 million Americans operated blogs (Kirsner, 2007,
February 4), so asking people how they feel about them is like asking
people how they feel about “broadcasters” without distinguishing
between Rush Limbaugh, Matt Lauer, and Christiane Amanpour.
It is no doubt tempting to use technology as a short-cut means
of characterizing and differentiating communicators. Many state
legislatures have used the same approach in fashioning the pressprotective statutes described earlier. But journalism has never been
understood as residing in a particular medium, so for any definitions
and categories to be useful, they must move beyond these structural
features to consider the ways in which the medium is being used.
Those who might be described as second-level journalists, therefore,
come from across the media spectrum and could include bloggers like
Ariana Huffington (Huffington Post) and Markos Moulitis (Daily Kos),
websites like Newsmax, print publications like The Progressive and The
American Prospect, and even television programs like Countdown with
Keith Olberman or The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. Each of these is a
source of news, even though it is occasionally coupled with opinion or
embedded within a larger work of satire. Each is produced regularly
and displayed prominently. Each presents itself as a news source (less
so with The Daily Show) and deliberately enters itself into a journalistic
culture in which its work is critiqued and rebutted. And each is focused
on the dissemination of what its contributors believe to be the truth,
even though they are not reliably attuned to the touchstones of toplevel journalism, for example, objectivity, balance, completeness, and
proportionality.
Many second-level journalists explicitly disavow the label of
journalist, either because they conceive of themselves differently or
because they do not want to be subjected to the more exacting
Journal of Mass Media Ethics, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2007): pg. 241-261. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Taylor & Francis (Routledge).

18

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

standards of the top level. Others embrace the term, however, either
to secure rights or privileges or to position themselves as trustworthy
arbiters. What many of them seek is simply the recognition that their
work has value and that it is to be believed, something that, to some
anyway, is connoted by the word “journalist.”
Much of the commentary from second-level journalists has a
triumphant, egalitarian ring to it, and there are some clear parallels
between the rhetoric in the professional ethics domain and the
egalitarian standards that often prevail in law. They both reject the
idea that the truth can only be told by properly trained and educated
specialists. They reject the idea that the freedom to gather news is a
superfluity for anyone working outside the media mainstream. Their
conception of journalism is one that emphasizes its function and
content and not its structure or institutional imprimatur. They might
not suggest that everyone is a journalist, but they certainly believe
anyone can be, and no law or bureaucracy or professional association
ought to be able to thwart or delegitimize those efforts. Despite these
similarities, the minimum-standards criteria of the legal domain's
egalitarian model are actually more permissive than those of secondlevel journalism. In some jurisdictions, for example, a university
professor or a documentary filmmaker might meet the requirements
for invoking the journalist's privilege but would not be engaged in the
kind of continuous collection, synthesis, and dissemination that define
second-level journalism. So, even though the egalitarian model from
the law domain might be useful in locating the distinctions among
communicators in the ethics domain, they are not perfectly
interchangeable.
The expert model is even less applicable here. One could argue
that even second-level journalists use expert rhetoric in separating
themselves from ordinary public communicators. That might be true in
some instances, but it is certainly not as common among second-level
journalists as it is among top-level journalists. The former, even in
distinguishing themselves from public communicators, are less likely to
emphasize their unique expertise or credentials than they are simply
to identity the ways in which what they do is different.
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Second-Level vs. Top-Level Journalists
The second and perhaps more important distinction that might
be made in the domain of professional ethics is between second-level
journalists, who are principally focused on truthfully communicating
news to others, and top-level journalists, who are not merely
concerned with telling the truth but also with honoring the ethical
canons of traditional American journalism, such as independence,
proportionality, comprehensiveness, and accountability.
There are many bases upon which traditional (top-level)
journalists have sought to set themselves apart—training, education,
affiliation—but their actions are ultimately what define their work, not
these peripheral credentials. The debate in this domain is too often
sidetracked by these expert-model characteristics when what really
matters—indeed the only things that matter—are the standards of
practice that journalists follow in their pursuit and dissemination of
news.

Training. Some top-level journalists will point to their education,
either on-the-job or in journalism schools, as a way of separating
themselves from other public communicators. To them, education, like
affiliation (discussed below), is often seen as a foundation for ethical
standards of practice. It is in these formal settings (newsrooms or
classrooms) that ethical values are introduced and reinforced. The
value of education in making this distinction is seen among those
studying journalism as well as those practicing it. For example, one
student at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism said a
journalist was a “trained writer” who “perceives an event and reports it
accurately” (Konner, 1996, p. 4).

Top-level journalists are more than just chroniclers of events.
They see journalism as a “call to search for the truth” (Konner, 1996,
p. 4). As former Washington Post editor Howard Simons noted:
People who come into the newspaper business are somewhat
hyperactive, somewhat creative and somewhat causists. I don't
mean that in the contemporary sense of the word. I mean they
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have some sense, rooted in their stomach, of injustice which the
newspaper gives them an instrument to correct. (Cannon, 1997,
p. 13)
Those fighting to right wrongs
are now as likely to be found
in the blogosphere as they are
in the A sections of local
newspapers.
Interestingly, this describes individuals whom many top-level
journalists would likely exclude from their category. Those fighting to
right wrongs are now as likely to be found in the blogosphere as they
are in the A sections of local newspapers.

Affiliation. Some of those engaged in the debate in the professional
ethics domain have suggested that a true journalist must be
associated with an organization (usually brick and mortar) whose
primary work is the business of producing news. Applying this
restriction, Washington Post editors and CNN reporters would be
journalists, but most bloggers, and even those working for online news
organizations such as Slate.com or The Hotline, might not. In addition,
commentators like Bill O'Reilly and Maureen Dowd would be
considered journalists, even though they are not necessarily
committed to the traditional standards of practice.

Standards of Practice. Top-level journalists find moral duty in their
occupations and take seriously the idea that journalism is a public
trust. These commitments are often expressed through their codes of
ethics (although there are certainly some top-level journalists who
honor these principles without writing them down or professing them
publicly). The codes, which can be traced to the beginning of printing
in the United States and which were concretized in the early 20th
century by organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper
Editors and the Society of Professional Journalists, provide a set of
professional benchmarks that reflect a kind of fiduciary spirit. The
codes articulate the underlying values of the profession and detail
behaviors the public has come to expect: neutrality, independence,
accountability, and comprehensiveness. They also suggest that
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journalists minimize harm in pursuing the news, that they stay
cognizant of the public interest, and that they serve as reliable
watchdogs of powerful people and institutions. Some individual
journalists or organizations go even further, of course, and suggest
that journalism is also about giving voice to the voiceless or healing
society's wounds.
Still others focus less on these behavioral guidelines and more
on the traits exhibited by individual journalists. Ugland and Slattery
(2006) argued that top-level journalists (what they called “true
professionals”) are those who follow particular habits of reliable
reporting and whose “judgment, character and introspection” gives
their work special weight (par. 6). Journalists exercise good judgment
“by recognizing ethical problems when they arise” (par. 7), they
demonstrate character when they empathize with others and make
selfless decisions, and they act introspectively when they regularly
reflect on the long-term impact of their work.
What all of these examples have in common is that they reject
affiliation, training, and education as legitimate bases upon which to
differentiate journalists and instead emphasize the broader social
impact of journalism and the responsibilities of journalists to act as
stewards of the public interest. That requires a great deal more than
merely telling the truth.

Distinguishing the Legal Definitions
Because the egalitarian model in the law domain provides all
communicators equal protections, it is of no use when deciding who is
a top-level journalist. Those debates should instead be focused on the
elucidation of criteria by which we can assess the value of people's
contributions to the marketplace of ideas. They are pointedly about
separating the good from the mediocre and the mediocre from the
bad, about making plain declarations about the social value of content
and of content providers. The constitutional law debate, by contrast, is
not about the value of particular communications but about the “equal
concern and respect” (Dworkin, p. 180) we must show for the
communicators. The egalitarian model is also not helpful here because
it does not help us, as consumers of news, differentiate news providers
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based on the content of their work. The egalitarian model is more
focused on structural characteristics and the most basic behavioral
characteristics but is not a useful framework for evaluating content.
The expert model, created by statutory distinctions, may seem
at first glance to be a better fit. Here, categories of individuals
affiliated with institutions, or set apart by education, or by time spent
on the job, or with work published in a specific medium are declared
“journalists” under the law. The problem, of course, is that these
distinctions are arbitrary (especially in a digital world) and focus on
who someone is rather than on what he or she does. These statutes
have nothing to do with weighing the relative merit of each writer but
instead single out those who work in traditional newsrooms for legal
protection while abandoning all other communicators.

Conclusion
As power shifts away from a handful of traditional news
organizations toward a diverse collection of individuals and institutions,
the matter of who defines the parameters of journalistic behavior must
also shift. While once the sole domain of news associations such as
ASNE and RTNDA, the ethical guidelines of news in the 21st century
will increasingly be formulated by creators and audience members
unaffiliated with formal institutions. Ultimately, in the professional
ethics domain, the question of who is a journalist is in the eye of the
beholder. Consumers decide for themselves who is a journalist, who is
to be believed and whom to offer their attention and esteem.
In the law domain, fundamental rights are at stake, so the
consequences of defining protections for newsgathering and
expression too narrowly (especially when the party drawing the line is
the government) are substantially greater than in the professional
ethics domain where the debate is more about virtue than freedom. In
the legal domain, there is an element of coercion—the exercise of
government power to restrain behavior. That is not true in the
professional ethics domain. There, it is about a private dispute among
communicators regarding whose work is more valuable.
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“Who is a journalist?” is often treated as a single question,
capable of a single answer. But, those four words are really just a
vessel for a group of distinct definitional questions. The problem is not
merely that the participants are approaching the issue from different
perspectives and through their own particular prisms, but that they
have convinced themselves that this is really about a single question
rather than several. There are, in fact, two central domains in which
the definitional question is being contested and several discrete
contexts within those domains. By conflating these, we short-circuit a
vital debate in professional ethics and push the debate in law toward
excessively narrow standards of eligibility.
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